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In the first quarter of the 21st century, we have used terms like civil 
disobedience, counter-insurgency, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, 
insurrection, internal security, revolutionary warfare, small wars, 
subversion, terrorism, Fourth Generation Warfare (4 GW), grey zone, 
hybrid, sub-conventional and conventional conflicts. These are more 
often intra-state than inter-state.1 However, a Sino-Indian conflict, in 
all probability, would be an inter-state conflict. With China, it could be 
conventional, sub-conventional, grey zone or hybrid. A grey zone conflict 
is best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature. It 
is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional 
military conflict and open inter-state war. Grey zone challenges are 
ambiguous and usually incrementally aggressive. Grey zone conflicts, exist 
short of a formal state of war.2 These conflicts fall between war and peace. 
The International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) of the Department of 
State of the United States (US) carried out an exercise to list grey zone 
conflicts and found that they include the following:
  Cyber, information operations, efforts to undermine public/allied/
local/regional resistance, information/propaganda in support of 
other hybrid instruments.
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  Covert operations under state control, espionage, infiltration and 
subversion. 
  Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other state controlled armed 
units and unacknowledged military personnel.
  Support logistics, political and financial, for terrorist and insurgent 
movements.
  Enlistment of non-governmental actors, including organised criminal 
groups, terrorists. Further, this includes extremist political, religious, 
ethnic and sectarian organisations.
  Assistance to irregular military and paramilitary forces.
  Economic pressures that go beyond economic competition.
  Manipulation and discrediting of democratic institutions, including 
the electoral system and judiciary.
  Calculated ambiguity, use of covert/unacknowledged operations, 
deception and denial.
  Explicit or implicit use or threats of use of armed force, terrorism and 
abuse of the civil population, and escalation.3
On the other hand, the most lucid definition of hybrid warfare 
that this article agrees with is given by Frank Hoffman. In his seminal 
work,Hoffman clarifies that hybrid wars are polymorphous by their 
nature as are its antagonists. Further, it would be increasingly difficult to 
characterise states as comprising only traditional forces or non-state actors 
who may be termed as irregular. Operational challenges will present a 
complex array of alternative structures and strategies. It is in all likelihood 
that there would be hybrid challenges capable of launching hybrid wars. 
These wars can be waged by states or political groups and incorporate a 
range of different modes of war, including conventional, irregular tactics 
and formations, terrorist acts which would include violence, coercion and 
criminal disorder. They would target the strategic cultural weaknesses 
of the conventional thought process of waging a battle effectively. The 
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important characteristics are convergence and combinations which occur 
in several modes.4 Overall, Hoffman’s study finds that conventional, 
irregular and terrorist types of warfare are not isolated challenges.
It is also important to understand what Margaret Bond says about 
the subject. According to her, “Hybrid war envisions employment of a 
comprehensive and highly nuanced variety of military activities, resources, 
programs and applications tailored to maximise a nonviolent, persuasive 
use of political and economic influence to reform hostile governments, 
movements or trends in politically, socially and economically unstable 
conditions, characteristic of failing and failed states. It also includes a full 
range of military intelligence capabilities, non-lethal weapons, armaments, 
support units available for instant employment if ever opposition elements 
of regular forces or irregular insurgents cross the hostility threshold and 
constitute a direct threat to, or threaten, these non-hostile activities”.5 
Bond’s definition, though comprehensive is essentially at the level of the 
government. Like the grey zone, which is a sub-set of hybrid conflicts 
and describes an environment between war and peace. Having dealt with 
these aspects, it would be essential to understand the Chinese intent.
Chinese Intent
Henry Kissinger in his book,On China, mentions that China’s strategy 
generally exhibits three characteristics: meticulous analysis of long,-
term trends, careful study of tactical options and detailed exploration 
of operational decisions.6 The Chinese style of dealing with strategic 
decisions is undertaken through analysis, careful preparation, attention 
to psychological and political factors as also quest for surprise with a 
conclusion arrived at rapidly.
It is noteworthy that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of 
China is closely knit to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and is 
politically and militarily involved in all the activities of the country. The 
modernisation of the PLA and its rising global status could either make 
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it a more responsible international power or its assertive stance would 
harden further, leading to clashes with existing and emerging powers. 
In order to understand the path which China is likely to adopt, it is 
important to comprehend China’s defence policy which stems from the 
modernisation of the PLA.
There has been hardly any research in India on the modernisation of 
the Chinese armed forces and its impact on India’s security. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established in 1949 under the Chairmanship 
of Mao Ze Dong. It is one of the oldest civilisations, with a history filled with 
military activities for the last 4,500 years. China’s traditions with regard 
to its military have emerged from its strategic concerns, war experience, 
civil-military relations and technological development. Chinese history is 
full of military conquests. It is pertinent to note that each imperial dynasty 
and modern government came to power through a military struggle. In 
the 20th century, the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party or KMT) 
came to power through revolutionary wars against the Qing dynasty 
which had ruled China from 1644 to 1912. Thereafter, the CCP defeated 
the KMT through the war for liberation in 1949. Accordingly, Chinese 
military history is essential for comprehending the Chinese civilisation, 
political institutions and foreign policy.7
The present Chinese government was formed in 1949.8 The 
PLA, which was formed under the CCP is an organ of the Party and, 
thus, obeys the diktat of the Party and also has its proportionate 
representation in various policy committees of the CCP. The PLA 
participated actively in both the Great Leap Forward, Mao Ze Dong’s 
Cultural Revolution and in the modernisation programmes of Deng 
Xiao Ping. Further, it fought the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, 
the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the Ussuri river conflict with Russia in 
1969, and the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979. However, since then, for 
about 39 years, China has not fought a major war,though the PLA has 
been involved in skirmishes in the South China Sea, intrusions in the 
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East China Sea and Tibet, as also in making preparations for a possible 
military offensive against Taiwan. China has also developed its own 
defence industry which enables it to indigenously produce state-of-
the-art weaponry. 
According to Lieutenant General JS Bajwa, “Though Chinese White 
Papers always state their attitude of being defensive and peaceful, its 
intentions appear to be deceptive”.9 China’s official media continues to 
publicise articles intended to caution India that China retains the option 
of initiating military hostilities. Wen Wei Po, a Hong Kong based daily, 
owned by the People’s Republic of China, with editorial staff from 
the CCP and controlled by the ruling Politburo Standing Committee, 
published an article in June 2013, captioned “Six Wars to be Fought by 
China in the Next 50 Years”. It was reposted on a Hong Kong website 
around the middle of September 2013. The details of the author’s 
background are yet to be ascertained and the contents have possibly been 
obtained from Chinese defence analysts. The article asserts that China 
can wipe out past humiliations and regain its dignity only after it attains 
national reunification. The article visualises the six wars that would have 
to be fought by China in the next 50 years to achieve its goal. The wars 
which are visualised are as under: 
  For the unification of Taiwan, which is expected to be fought between 
2020 to 2025.
  For the capture of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, possibly 
in the timeline 2025 to 2030.
  For the reconquest of southern Tibet (Arunachal) which would 
possibly be undertaken in the years 2035 to 2040.
  For the capture of Diaoyu Island and Ryukyu Island between 2040 
and 2045.
  For the unification of Outer Mongolia around 2045 to 2050.
  To militarily recapture the territory lost to Russia between 2055 and 
2060. 
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The anticipated six wars deal with reclaimation of the Chinese national 
territories lost since Imperial China was defeated by the British in the 
Opium War of 1840-42. The first option that deals with Taiwan states 
that Taiwan must peacefully unite by 2020, failing which the country 
should be unified by war which should take place by 2025.10 This would 
be a test for the modernised PLA. The war would be difficult in case there 
is an intervention by the USA and Japan. The author feels that in such a 
case, the war would last for six months,or for three months.
It is forecast that there would be a slight pause for two years after the 
reunification of Taiwan. During this period, China is likely to send an 
ultimatum to the countries patrolling the islands in the South China Sea 
to withdraw, with a deadline of 2028.11 The countries can preserve their 
investments followed by withdrawal. China anticipates that Vietnam and 
the Philippines will oppose the move, and both of them will fight, with 
possible assistance from the US. As per the author, if concrete results are 
not attained by negotiations, then the best option is for China to attack 
Vietnam. The reason is obvious as Vietnam is the most powerful country 
in the region. Victory over Vietnam will scare the rest. While the war 
with Vietnam goes on, the other claimants would adopt a wait and watch 
policy. China is expected to beat Vietnam, as per the author, and, thus, 
it would establish its suzerainty over the entire Spratly group of islands.
The third war would be for the reconquest of southern Tibet 
(Arunachal) in the years 2035 to 2040. The article emphatically states 
that Arunachal is the only point of conflict between India and China. 
It further notes the close relations between India, and the US, Europe 
and Russia. It assumes that during this period, India would militarily 
lag behind China. However, war with India would result in victory after 
sustaining losses. 
Accordingly, the best strategy that China might apply would be 
to initiate disintegration of the region. It will probably leave no stone 
unturned to instigate Assam and Sikkim to fight for independence. The 
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other option is to provide state-of-the-art weaponry to Pakistan which 
would enable the country to capture the Indian part of Kashmir by 
2035 and thereby enable Pakistani control of the entire region. While 
the fight is on for Kashmir, China could launch an attack to conquer 
Arunachal. As per the author, India lacks the capability to successfully 
fight a two-front war. However, if this plan cannot be adopted, the other 
option is to launch a ground offensive to capture Arunachal (southern 
Tibet).12
It is pertinent to note that this article may not have emanated from 
the higher levels in China’s military establishment, but it iterates an issue 
often emphasised by the Chinese media that the country will ultimately 
have to resort to the use of the PLA to settle border issues. Articles of 
similar nature have been appearing in the Chinese press ever since the 
Review of Asia Policy was undertaken in 2011. A publication of the official 
China mouthpiece, in November 2011, recommended that China adopt 
new approaches in dealing with its neighbours. It further stated that 
goodwill may not bring harmony and, sometimes, certain altercations 
with neighbours are appropriate and can result in the return of peace.8 
It is, therefore, important to study the threat that China poses to India. 
In all probability, a full scale conventional war may not be fought but a 
hybrid threat to India does exist. 
Hybrid Warfare in the Sino-Indian Context
The Chinese are adept at modernising their armed forces, learning from 
the Gulf Wars as also the hybrid war fought by Russia in 2014 in which it 
annexed Crimea. The Crimean operation was marked by its simultaneous 
use of the civil and military sectors. It was a combination of irregular, 
conventional and cyber warfare. It is to be noted that, historically, 
China has been adept at asymmetric warfare. Of late, China has begun 
to adopt hybrid warfare capabilities. China is demonstrating its hybrid 
capabilities particularly in the maritime domain in the South China Sea 
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and the Indian Ocean. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
has developed enormously in the last 20 years, acquiring new warships, 
submarines, aircraft carriers and naval aircraft. With these resources, 
China has occupied a large portion of the Paracel and Spratly groups 
of islands as also developed ports to its advantage in the Indian Ocean. 
These include Djibouti, Gwadar, Hambantota, Kyakphu and possibly a 
new port, Sonadia, in Bangladesh. 
Around 2014, China also heavily relied on its maritime militia, in 
Mandarin known as haishangmingbing. Like the Russians in Crimea 
were known as the little green men, the Chinese militia is called the little 
blue men.13 These little blue men operate when required in conventional 
operations with the PLAN and often disguise themselves as Chinese 
fishermen and attack other ships operating in the South China Sea in an 
unconventional role. The concurrent use of fishermen as civilians who 
turn themselves into active military personnel and vice versa in accordance 
with the operational environment they are faced with explains how the 
Chinese hybrid warfare operates. Once China stabilises the ports in the 
Indian Ocean, it would have these maritime hybrid warriors who would 
start operating and disturbing maritime traffic in the periphery of India’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
The next issue which directly impacts our land border is the Chinese 
strategy of salami slicing.14 This implies use of non-linear operations 
to gradually gain more pieces of land. This is applicable to building of 
artificial islands in the South China Sea, as also the disputed areas along 
the Sino-Indian border. This has been observed at Depsang, Chumar and 
Doklam where the Chinese creep in and try to grab territory. Wherever 
possible, China is also using cabbage tactics to encircle areas on land or 
in the sea which it claims, to block entry and exit to these areas, thereby 
leading to their eventual collapse. As India has hydro-carbon assets in 
the South China Sea,the Chinese activities have to be observed as the 
same could be applied in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The Indian 
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armed forces have categorically mentioned salami slicing in their various 
discussions. 
The Chinese are also using cyber warfare which is an important 
component of hybrid warfare. The Chinese have developed a new facet 
of hybrid warfare. They believe in using the civilian population to play 
an active role in cyber operations. The government has promoted the 
creation of cyber warrior units directly composed of university students 
and civilians.15 Further, as per reports emanating, Chinese telecom 
companies are closely controlled by the government. But the telecom 
companies do not agree and have taken legal recourse to prove that they 
are free from Chinese government controls. This has led Chinese telecom 
products being seen in India and their companies are in the run for the 
5G contract.
The last issue is the PLA’s capability to instigate insurgency and 
rebellion in the northeastern region which has been discussed in the 
Chinese article on the six wars. The northeastern region has insurgent 
groups operating which could be supported by China.
Having observed the Chinese aspect of hybrid warfare, it would be 
important to examine what the drivers of a possible Sino-Indian conflict 
are. This would lead us to important observations as hybrid warfare 
encompasses conventional, sub-conventional, irregular and other forms 
of warfare.
Drivers of a Possible Sino-Indian Conflict
The drivers of conflict could be the following:
  Tibet Issue: Tibet remains a core issue between India and China. India 
would like China to begin a process of reconciliation and healing in 
Tibet in its own interest and for stable Sino-Indian relations. Beijing 
considers Arunachal as a part of Tibet and has been claiming the entire 
state. Further, China has been building dams on the Brahmaputra 
river and tampering with the flow at the Great Bend. Moreover, the 
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choice of the new Dalai Lama is causing consternation in the region. 
All these issues could exacerbate and result in them going out of 
control. Being sensitives issue, these could result in hostilities.16
  India-US Strategic Partnership: Signalling renewed depth in ties, 
India and the US, on January 25, 2015, decided to further elevate the 
long-standing strategic partnership by enhancing cooperation in a raft 
of crucial areas to include defence, trade and commerce, technology 
transfer, counter-terrorism and climate change.17 The joint declaration 
mentions freedom of navigation and freedom of flight which refers to 
the oceans and the skies. In his Republic Day message, the US President 
offered to raise the strategic partnership to a higher level. An article that 
appeared in the Global Times and People’s Daily on January 25, 2015, 
cautioned India not to fall into the trap which was being laid to pit 
New Delhi against Beijing. It added that many Western media reports 
have pointed out that the US, regardless of historical complications, 
is putting greater efforts into soliciting India to act as a partner, even 
an ally, to support Washington’s pivot to Asia strategy, which is mainly 
devised to counter China’s rise. In a further elaboration, the Daily 
pointed to the West’s ulterior motive to frame the Chinese dragon and 
the Indian elephant as natural rivals. The West is egging India to be fully 
prepared for the threat by rivals. These issues can cause provocation, 
which could throw things out of control. The Quad, which remains 
a diplomatic partnership among the US, Japan, Australia and India, 
could gradually transform into a military partnership, making issues 
more serious between China and India.
  High Profile Posturing in the Indian Ocean Region: Reports 
emanating from Beijing indicating that China is contemplating 
setting up military bases overseas to counter American influence, and 
exerting pressure on India, have been interpreted by some sections as 
a veiled reference to China’s interest in securing a permanent military 
presence in Pakistan. Although it may not be politically feasible for 
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the Pakistan government to openly allow China to set up a military 
base, New Delhi fears that Islamabad may allow Beijing’s use of its 
military facilities without any public announcement. It is possible 
to explain the construction of these ports and facilities by China on 
purely economic and commercial grounds, but regional and global 
powers like the US, Japan and India inevitably view the sum total 
of China’s diplomatic and military efforts in the Indian Ocean as 
projecting power vis-à-vis competing rivals. Moreover, most of 
Chinese naval facilities in the Indian Ocean are of dual use nature and 
no serious strategy can discount their future military use. The notion 
that China aspires to dominate the Indian Ocean is a bit far-fetched. 
However, China wishes to play a greater role in the region, to protect 
and advance its interests, especially its commercial interests, as also 
to counter India. Countering India will be a difficult task, given the 
immense geographical advantages that India enjoys in the Indian 
Ocean. Even the task of protecting the Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) remains challenging for the PLA Navy as of now. Currently, 
the steps that China is taking have caused concerns. In 2009, a sonar 
standoff is reported to have taken place between the Indian Navy 
and Chinese Navy while their ships were proceeding to the Gulf of 
Aden.5 In the year 2014, two incidents of Chinese submarines visiting 
Sri Lanka were viewed with concern by India. As both the Navies get 
stronger, such posturing might lead to an accidental conflagration 
which could result in confrontation. It is reported that Chinese 
nuclear submarines sporadically foray into the Indian Ocean.
  Water Issue: The taming of the Brahmaputra by China could have 
major implications for India. China certainly wants to utilise the 
Tibetan water resources for its development. It is presumed that one 
day, China may divert waters from the Great Bend of the Yarlung 
Tsangpo (Brahmaputra river), north of the McMahon Line, building 
another mammoth dam, much bigger than the Three Gorges Dam 
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which currently is the biggest dam in the world. China has viewed 
Engineer Guo Kai’s ‘Shuotian Canal Project’ as a perfect model 
which would save China with Tibet’s waters. In addition, this will be 
another gigantic power plant with an astonishing generating capacity 
of 20,000 to 40,000 Mega Watts (MW). This, if constructed, will be 
three times bigger than the hydroelectric plant at the Three Gorges 
Dam. This one plant can provide five times the energy requirement 
of Bangladesh. The taming of this river will require explosives of a 
very high magnitude. The impact would be profound and impact the 
people of northeast India and Bangladesh. Further, the area being 
seismically unstable, the construction of the dam would cause severe 
earthquakes. In addition, there is a proposal to build 28 dams on the 
Brahmaputra, which would sequester silt that normally gets washed 
to the flood plains of India and Bangladesh, renewing the fertility of 
their agricultural lands. All this is bound to exacerbate tensions and 
could lead to hostilities.
  Collapse of Pakistan: Pakistan is an unstable state with factionalism 
running against the dominant Punjabis by groups from Balochistan and 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). There are issues between 
the Sindhis, Punjabis and Baluchis which could cause friction, as also 
problems with the Shia population of Gilgit Baltistan. Further, the 
ethnic divide has been exacerbated by the Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI) of Pakistan which has links with numerous terrorist groups 
operating in Pakistan. Some of the terror groups operate against 
Afghanistan, some against India, and some against the Government 
of Pakistan itself. The economy is in the doldrums and the politicians 
are destabilising the country. The Pakistani armed forces have some 
Islamic elements who are in league with these terror groups. All this 
could result in the collapse of the state and the Chinese would see an 
Indian hand in it which could lead to China attempting to teach a 
lesson to India.
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  Border Dispute: The border dispute remains unresolved and 
there are sporadic standoffs between troops deployed on both 
sides. There have been altercations and it does not take long for a 
small incident to get blown up. The current stalemate is dangerous 
and could lead to hostilities between the two sides. The Indian 
Prime Minister visited China in May 2015. Despite friendly talks, 
he stated that the border issue is like a toothache which could 
easily conflagrate into hostilities.18 The issue was raised during 
the informal Wuhan Summit between President Xi Jinping and 
Prime Minister Modi on April 27-28, 2018. Both sides directed 
their militaries to earnestly implement various confidence-building 
measures in the border areas.19
What Lies Ahead and India’s Response
Currently, China is straining every sinew to become a global power by 
2049. It is modernising its armed forces, and despite all the hiccups, 
including an ongoing trade war with the United States, its economy is 
riding high. In all this, China is currently undertaking hybrid warfare with 
its maritime forces, salami slicing with its land forces, and cyber warfare 
with its special forces. It continues to be a friend of Pakistan that assists 
non-state terrorists operating in India. China is certainly interested in its 
claim over Arunachal and could possibly assist insurgent activity in the 
northeastern region. With all this, what is China likely to do militarily to 
disturb the prevailing situation? Visualisations of this is elucidated below. 
All these actions may be spread over a protracted period and could be 
sporadic, being suitably calibrated to suit the Chinese intentions:
  Destruction of Indian reconnaissance satellites by Anti-Satellite 
(ASAT) weapons.
  Transgressions at places of consequence.
  Interfering with the commercial Indian shipping in the Indian Ocean.
  Continuing to build bases in the Indian Ocean.
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  Diverting the Brahmaputra at the Great Bend.
  If the need arises, capturing an area of significance with a shower 
of conventional ballistic missiles, overwhelming firepower of the 
artillery and swift attacks by the ground forces.
  Building the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and 
surreptitiously encouraging Pakistan to continue the proxy war in 
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)as also encouraging insurgency in the 
northeast.
  Launching sporadic cyber operations to disrupt the communications 
network, as well as launching social media campaigns to cause 
turbulence in India.
All these aspects need to be carefully analysed. Overall, India needs to 
take the following measures:
  Develop a national security strategy and a strategic response to China 
by intensification of strategic partnerships with the United States, 
Japan, Vietnam, Australia and Russia.
  Build up our comprehensive national power. 
  Joint operations in networked conditions, with improved surveillance.
  Build infrastructure along the border with speed and military 
precision.
  Modernise our armed forces to cater for the hybrid threats from 
China and Pakistan.
  Reorganise our Defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO)to focus only on cutting edge technologies.
  Provide the private sector a level playing field, especially in defence 
production.
  Develop pockets of excellence by focussing on hybrid warfare, cyber 
warfare and assassin’s mace weapons.
  Create a diplomatic strategy to win war as also peace.
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To conclude,one must realise that China respects strength. India must 
enhance both its soft power and hard power to build its comprehensive 
national power to undertake any misadventure.
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